Andrew C. Winner is Adjunct Professor of Strategic Studies at SAIS Europe, and Professor, Strategic and Operational Research Department, US Naval War College. He held the position of Chair of the Strategic and Operational Research Department, at the Naval War College (2013-2019). His areas of focus are South Asia, counterproliferation, European security, the Indian Ocean, maritime partnerships, and maritime strategy. He is director of the Indian Ocean Studies Group at the Naval War College. In June 2007, he was awarded the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Award for his work on the Navy’s new maritime strategy. Prior to his current appointment, he was a senior staff member at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Prior to joining the Institute, he held positions at the U.S. Department of State on the staff of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs and in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs where he worked on nonproliferation, security in the Persian Gulf, NATO enlargement, arms transfer policy, and security assistance. He also worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on conventional arms control. He is co-editor with Peter Dombrowski of The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy: Ensuring Access and Promoting Security, Georgetown University Press, 2014. He is also the co-author of Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, Routledge, 2009. He holds a PhD from the University of Maryland, College Park, an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and an A.B. from Hamilton College.
- The US Response: Naval Architecture and Plans, in India-China Maritime Competition: the Security Dilemma at Sea, R. Basrur, A. Mukherjee and T.V. Paul (editors), Taylor&Francis (2019)
- How North Korea Skirts Sanctions With Its Illicit Arms Trade, in World Politics Review (November 27, 2017)
- America's Indian Ocean Strategy, in Strategic Comments 23:9 (2017), Taylor&Francis
- Interdicting North Korean Vessels: Another False Hope, in 38north.org (October 4, 2017)
- Rip currents: The Dangers of Nuclear-armed Submarine Proliferation, with R. W. Franch, in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 72:4 (2016), Taylor&Francis
- Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in the Indian Ocean Region, with A.T. Weldemichael and P. Schneider (editors), Routledge (2015)
- Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia, in Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective, C. McArdle Kelleher and P. Dombrowski (editors), Stanford University Press (2015)
- The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy: Ensuring Access and Promoting Security, with P. Dombrowski (editors), Georgetown University Press (2014)
- Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century, with J. Holmes and T. Yoshihara, Routledge (2010)
This course is an introduction to strategic studies, which deals with the preparation and use of military power to serve the ends of politics. Although the treatment is topical, two themes run throughout: (1) the nature of war based largely, but not exclusively, on Carl von Clausewitz's On War and (2) the evolution of warfare from the late nineteenth century to the present. There are no prerequisites for this course; nevertheless, students will require a basic grasp of 20th and 21st century history. This course is NOT just for Strategic Studies concentrators; it is for anyone who wants to learn about how military force is thought about and used.
The course is divided into three main parts: an introductory discussion of strategic theory, focused on Clausewitz and alternatives to his theory of war; an examination of the paradigmatic form of mass warfare that emerged in the nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century; and, an examination of challenges that have emerged to that paradigm since World War II.
The course is taught through a combination of lecture and discussion. By the course’s conclusion, students will understand the theory and history of strategic studies and will be equipped to apply that knowledge to the major dilemmas animating international security affairs today.